PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are calculated in-house from the last 4 quarters (2025Q3–2026Q2) · Dividend yield is based on ₩3,000 per share · Prices as of the 2026-10-02 close
Mega Study Edu rebuilt net profit in 2025, but its core high-school segment margin slipped in H1 2026 as the company faces both offline expansion costs and intensifying competition.
2025 revenue was KRW 884.9bn, operating profit KRW 121.0bn, and owners' net income KRW 85.3bn, a sharp year-on-year net income recovery.
In H1 2026, consolidated revenue rose only slightly while operating profit declined year-on-year, and the high-school segment—over 60% of sales—saw double-digit operating profit contraction.
Rival Highconsy (Sidaegajae) has recently posted around 20%-range growth in both revenue and operating profit, closing the gap quickly.
The company launched a new brand, MEXX, targeting top-tier in-school-record students and expanded offline academies, which has increased lease-related fixed costs.
In its 2026 value-up plan, the company set targets of 9% revenue CAGR, 19% operating profit CAGR for 2025-2027, and a shareholder return ratio of '60%+alpha'.
Mega Study Edu's core business is the high-school segment—online/offline lectures, mock exams, and textbooks for high schoolers and repeat-year (N-su) students—which accounts for more than 60% of revenue.
The portfolio also includes the early-childhood/elementary/middle-school segment (brands such as Elihigh and MBest), a university transfer-prep segment run through subsidiary IB Kimyoung, and a career segment covering talent development in AI, big data, and semiconductors.
Its flagship product, the Megapass unlimited-lecture subscription, underpins online revenue and recently added an annual subscription tier and AI-based learning features.
In offline education, the intensive repeat-year dormitory brand Russell has long competed in a "big three" structure with Daesung Academy and Etoos, but Sidaegajae, a Daechi-dong-based rival, has recently entered the dormitory-academy market, reshaping the competitive landscape.
Anticipating that in-school-record (naeshin) grades will gain importance under the 2028 college admissions system reform, the company launched a new offline brand, MEXX, earlier this year targeting top-tier naeshin students.
In 2024 the company divested its civil-service exam-prep business, and in 2025 it acquired the operations of Unistudy, run by subsidiary IB Kimyoung, further reshaping its business mix.
While the company still leads competitors in absolute revenue and profit scale, its recent growth rate has lagged behind faster-growing rivals.
| Quarter | Revenue | Operating profit | Op. margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025Q2 | ₩201B | ₩32.7B | 16.2% |
| 2025Q3 | ₩249.7B | ₩53.2B | 21.3% |
| 2025Q4 | ₩196.6B | ₩9B | 4.6% |
| 2026Q1 | ₩236.5B | ₩26B | 11.0% |
| 2026Q2 | ₩204.7B | ₩28.4B | 13.9% |
| Year | Revenue | Operating profit | Net income (parent) | Op. margin | ROE | Debt-to-equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | ₩836B | ₩135.4B | ₩99.6B | 16.2% | 23.7% | 108.6% |
| 2023 | ₩935.2B | ₩127.4B | ₩94.6B | 13.6% | 19.8% | 94.4% |
| 2024 | ₩942.2B | ₩123.6B | ₩46.2B | 13.1% | 10.3% | 88.2% |
| 2025 | ₩884.9B | ₩121B | ₩85.3B | 13.7% | 17.2% | 72.2% |
Consolidated basis (financial statements including subsidiaries) · Final figures from DART filings · Net income attributable to owners of the parent · Data as of 2026-08-17
On an annual basis, 2025 revenue of KRW 884.9bn was lower than 2024's KRW 942.2bn, but operating profit of KRW 121.0bn held up relatively well, and owners' net income jumped sharply from KRW 46.2bn to KRW 85.3bn.
In 2024, operating profit (KRW 123.6bn) was far larger than net income (KRW 46.2bn), while in 2025 the gap between operating profit (KRW 121.0bn) and net income (KRW 85.3bn) narrowed, suggesting a lesser drag from non-operating items or one-off tax effects.
The operating margin trended down from 16.2% in 2022 to 13.6% in 2023 and 13.1% in 2024, before recovering slightly to 13.7% in 2025.
Quarterly results show clear seasonality: Q3 2025 (July-September), the peak season, posted revenue of KRW 249.7bn and operating profit of KRW 53.2bn, lifting the operating margin to roughly 21%, while Q4 2025 (October-December), the off-season, saw revenue fall to KRW 196.6bn and operating profit to just KRW 9.0bn, pushing the margin below 5%.
Q1 2026 recovered to KRW 236.5bn in revenue and KRW 26.0bn in operating profit, and Q2 2026 posted revenue of KRW 204.7bn, operating profit of KRW 28.4bn, and owners' net income of KRW 20.9bn.
For H1 2026 as a whole, however, operating profit declined year-on-year, with the high-school segment—over half of total revenue—showing a double-digit percentage drop in operating profit, a clear sign of margin erosion.
This has been attributed to rising instructor fees, outsourcing costs, and advertising spend deployed to defend market share amid a shrinking pool of students.
Korea's private education industry sits at the intersection of a structural headwind—a shrinking school-age population—and an offsetting tailwind from intensifying university admissions competition and rising numbers of repeat-year (N-su) applicants.
Even as the participation rate in private education and per-student spending trend lower statistically, demand from repeat-year students keeps hitting new highs each year, driven by expanded medical school quotas and uncertainty around admissions policy.
With the 2028 college admissions system reform expected to raise the importance of in-school-record (naeshin) grades, the industry's center of gravity is shifting from the previously CSAT- and online-centric model toward offline, naeshin-focused instruction.
Amid this shift, Daechi-dong-based newcomer Sidaegajae (operated by Highconsy) has posted rapid growth, challenging the long-standing "big three" of Daesung, Mega, and Etoos.
In the online lecture market, subscription models like Megapass show signs of slowing growth, while offline repeat-year dormitory academies and the elementary/middle-school smart-learning market appear comparatively resilient.
Overall, the industry has entered a phase defined less by aggregate growth than by share competition among brands and a business-model pivot from online to offline and from CSAT to naeshin.
The company re-disclosed its 2026 value-up plan, targeting 9% average annual revenue growth and 19% average annual operating profit growth for 2025-2027, along with an average price-to-book ratio (PBR) target of 1.3x over the same period as a market-valuation goal.
On shareholder returns, it aims for a shareholder return ratio of '60%+alpha' for 2024-2026 and a mid-term total shareholder return (TSR) target of 30%, with half-yearly share buybacks and full cancellation of repurchased shares as the implementation method.
On the business side, expansion of the new offline brand MEXX targeting top-tier naeshin students is a key variable; an LS Securities analyst noted in a May report that cost increases from academy expansion in key school districts could appear in the near term (Q2-Q4 2026), but offline expansion of the high-school segment could be expected from 2027 onward.
The early-childhood/elementary/middle-school segment continues to see improved results on the back of a growing smart-learning market, and the career segment is also expanding into talent development for AI, big data, and semiconductors.
The university-transfer subsidiary IB Kimyoung has been described as maintaining relatively favorable performance helped by expanded transfer admission quotas and solid product sales.
That said, rising lease-related fixed costs from offline expansion mean that, in the near term, the balance between cost growth and revenue recovery will likely be a key watch point for earnings.
The current share price appears to trade at a discount to net asset value, which can be read as reflecting market concerns over recent earnings softness and intensifying competition.
Looking at multi-year net income trends, the sharp decline in 2024 gave way to a clear recovery in 2025, though H1 2026 shows renewed pressure on high-school segment margins.
The company's own value-up plan target of an average 1.3x price-to-book ratio appears to differ meaningfully from where the stock currently trades, and whether that target is achieved will likely hinge on the pace of buyback/cancellation execution and earnings recovery.
On dividends, the company has stated it meets the high-dividend-company criteria under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, which has drawn attention for separate taxation of dividend income, though whether such tax benefits translate into a valuation re-rating remains to be seen.
On balance, rather than characterizing the stock as cheap or expensive relative to net assets, it appears to sit at a point of tension between the durability of the profit recovery and the fixed-cost burden from expanding offline investment.
PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are all calculated in-house (the same method as Naver and Toss) · Dividend yield = cash dividend per share from DART filings (supplemented by KRX) ÷ current price · As of 2026-08-17
Owners' net income surged from KRW 46.2bn to KRW 85.3bn in 2025, marking a clear move away from the one-off burdens seen in 2024. The operating margin also edged up from 13.1% to 13.7%. Whether this profit recovery continues into 2026 is a key point to watch.
In its value-up plan, the company set a shareholder return ratio target of '60%+alpha' for 2024-2026, with half-yearly buybacks and full cancellation as the execution method. It has also noted meeting high-dividend-company criteria under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act. Continued implementation of these policies could be a key variable for future shareholder value assessment.
The early-childhood/elementary/middle-school segment is improving on the back of a growing smart-learning market, and the career segment is growing through talent development in AI, big data, and semiconductors.
The university-transfer subsidiary IB Kimyoung has also been noted to benefit from expanded transfer admission quotas. Growth outside the high-school segment could act as a buffer for overall performance.
In H1 2026, high-school segment revenue was similar to the prior year, but operating profit fell 15.5%. This reflects rising instructor fee and advertising spend to defend market share amid declining private-education participation rates and per-student spending. Profitability erosion in this core segment—over 60% of revenue—directly weighs on overall results.
In H1 2026, newly acquired right-of-use (lease) assets reached KRW 64.0bn, 2.4 times the prior-year figure of KRW 26.6bn, and non-current long-term lease liabilities surged more than 89%. Unlike online lectures, offline infrastructure carries heavy fixed costs such as rent, depreciation, and personnel expenses. With online growth slowing, expanded offline investment could pressure near-term profitability.
Rival Highconsy (Sidaegajae) has recently grown revenue and operating profit at around 20%, catching up quickly.
Meanwhile, Mega Study Edu's contract liability balance rose only slightly, and revenue recognized from carried-over contract liabilities actually fell 5.2%, raising concerns about declining course-completion rates or expanded discounting. This could signal a slowdown in the pace of future revenue conversion.
The structural decline in the school-age population could constrain overall market size over the long term. If private-education regulation tightens or the details of admissions system reform differ from expectations, business strategy could be affected. Policy uncertainty is a common risk across the education industry.
Competition is intensifying as rivals such as Sidaegajae expand into dormitory academies and the naeshin market. If marketing and instructor-fee spending to defend share continues to rise, margin pressure could persist longer. Whether the new MEXX brand successfully establishes itself in the market also remains uncertain.
Rising lease liabilities and interest expense from offline academy expansion could weigh on the financial structure. The debt ratio fell from 108.6% in 2022 to 88.2% in 2024 and further to 72.2% in 2025, but it could rise again if offline investment accelerates. Continued deterioration in contract liability quality could affect the credibility of future revenue growth.
Q3 2026 earnings release, typically the peak season—worth checking the degree of operating margin recovery and whether the high-school segment margin rebounds.
Check the scale of repeat-year (N-su) test-takers and enrollment trends at intensive/dormitory academies for signals on the 2027 high-school segment revenue outlook.
Check whether and to what extent the H2 2026 share buyback and cancellation announced in the value-up plan is actually executed.
Monitor MEXX brand enrollment results and whether offline-expansion-related fixed costs (lease liabilities, interest expense) increase further.
Mega Study Edu laid the groundwork for improved performance with a sharp net income recovery in 2025, but in H1 2026 operating profit in the high-school segment—over 60% of revenue—fell by a double-digit percentage, reopening cracks in profitability.
Amid structural pressures from a shrinking school-age population and declining private-education participation, rapid growth from rivals such as Sidaegajae is intensifying the battle for market share.
The company is responding with a new brand, MEXX, and offline academy expansion, but this comes with rising lease-related fixed costs that could pressure near-term profitability. Leading indicators, such as a declining conversion rate on contract liabilities, also show some signs of qualitative deterioration.
That said, the growth targets and shareholder return policy laid out in the company's value-up plan offer a sense of medium-to-long-term direction worth watching alongside these pressures.
On balance, the stock sits at a point of tension between the durability of its profit recovery and rising costs from offline investment, and ongoing quarterly results and shifts in the competitive landscape warrant continued attention.
Report written 2026-09-05 · Data as of 2026-09-04
This content is AI analysis of market data and web search results, provided for information only. It is not a solicitation or recommendation to invest. Investment decisions and their consequences are the investor's own responsibility. Data may be delayed or contain errors.