KOSDAQElectronic Components204270

Jntc

₩21,850▼ 0.46%2026-10-02 close
Market Cap
₩1.3T
Turnover
₩18.4B
Volume
830,000 shares
Shares out.
57.9M
PER
—
PBR
5.0×
EPS
-₩1,173
Dividend Yield
0.00%

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are calculated in-house from the last 4 quarters (2025Q3–2026Q2) · Dividend yield is based on ₩0 per share · Prices as of the 2026-10-02 close

01

Report overview

Deepening Losses, Glass Pivot at a Crossroads

As the legacy mobile cover-glass business has roughly halved over four years, the company's center of gravity is shifting to TGV glass substrates and HDD glass platters, but that shift has yet to show up in reported profits.

  1. 1

    2025 consolidated revenue fell to KRW 185.7bn from KRW 323.4bn in 2023, with an operating loss of KRW 78.0bn (operating margin -42.0%) and a net loss attributable to owners of KRW 91.6bn.

  2. 2

    The Q1 2026 operating loss narrowed to KRW 11.4bn, but Q2 2026 saw revenue of KRW 38.8bn and an operating loss of KRW 25.0bn, widening again.

  3. 3

    In June 2026 the company said it secured automotive 3D cover-glass supply contracts totaling KRW 250bn from three customers, including European and U.S. luxury brands.

  4. 4

    For TGV glass substrates, the company announced a 0.3-2.0mm thickness lineup in June 2026 and signed a commercialization agreement with Japan's TOPPAN in July, targeting mass production in 2027.

  5. 5

    The debt-to-equity ratio rose to 121.3% at end-2025 from 56.1% in 2022, and 2025 operating cash flow turned to negative KRW 2.3bn from positive KRW 38.7bn a year earlier.

02

Business structure

JNTC, founded in 1996 and listed on KOSDAQ in March 2020, is an advanced-materials and precision-components maker whose business splits into tempered glass (cover glass) and connectors.

The tempered-glass unit produces smartphone front cover glass, camera windows, smartwatch covers and automotive 3D cover glass, while the connector unit supplies C-type interfaces, SIM parts and other mobile interconnects.

The company says it began mass-producing 3D cover glass in 2014, commercialized keyless cover glass in 2019 and integrated automotive 3D cover glass in 2020, with manufacturing centered on its wholly owned Vietnamese unit, JNTC VINA.

Its customer base historically spanned Korean display and module makers alongside Chinese smartphone brands, and chip-procurement problems at a Greater China customer are cited as the core driver of the recent revenue contraction.

To fill that gap the company has been scaling automotive cover glass; in June 2026 it said it had secured automotive 3D cover-glass supply contracts worth a combined KRW 250bn from three customers, including European and U.S. luxury carmakers.

Management said the awards bring it to a mass-production setup covering seven vehicle models, and the CEO noted a new project award from a North American electric-vehicle brand was pending. The new-business axis has two prongs.

For TGV glass substrates, the company says it has built a vertically integrated chain covering glass processing, through-hole formation and plating in-house, drawing on affiliate Jinwoo Engineering's equipment-building know-how, plating technology from the connector business, and laser, etching and cutting techniques from tempered glass.

For HDD glass platters, it said it completed installation of a first mass-production line at its Vietnamese unit and disclosed an increase in capital spending at the Viet Tri plant from KRW 20bn to KRW 33bn.

03

Earnings trend

Quarterly revenue · Operating profit
RevenueOperating profit
Annual revenue · Operating profit
RevenueOperating profit
Quarterly results · Last 5 quarters
QuarterRevenueOperating profitOp. margin
2025Q2₩56.1B-₩23.8B−42.5%
2025Q3₩39.1B-₩17.9B−45.9%
2025Q4₩42.4B-₩22.1B−52.0%
2026Q1₩40B-₩11.4B−28.6%
2026Q2₩38.8B-₩25B−64.4%
Annual results
YearRevenueOperating profitNet income (parent)Op. marginROEDebt-to-equity
2022₩161.3B-₩44.3B-₩58.8B−27.5%−17.5%56.1%
2023₩323.4B₩28.5B₩17.7B8.8%5.0%84.3%
2024₩273.2B-₩46.1B-₩33.4B−16.9%−9.9%89.7%
2025₩185.7B-₩78B-₩91.6B−42.0%−37.0%121.3%

Consolidated basis (financial statements including subsidiaries) · Final figures from DART filings · Net income attributable to owners of the parent · Data as of 2026-09-04

04

Earnings analysis

The earnings path shows one recovery followed by renewed deterioration. From 2022 revenue of KRW 161.3bn and an operating loss of KRW 44.3bn (margin -27.5%), the company swung to a 2023 profit with revenue of KRW 323.4bn, operating income of KRW 28.5bn (margin 8.8%) and net income attributable to owners of KRW 17.7bn.

In 2024, however, revenue slipped to KRW 273.2bn with an operating loss of KRW 46.1bn (margin -16.9%) and a net loss of KRW 33.4bn; in 2025 revenue fell to KRW 185.7bn with an operating loss of KRW 78.0bn (margin -42.0%) and a net loss of KRW 91.6bn.

The company disclosed that results swung sharply on new-business investment costs, higher prototype and sample production expenses, and inventory valuation losses tied to falling Greater China mobile product sales.

Quarterly, revenue and operating loss ran KRW 56.1bn / KRW 23.8bn in Q2 2025, KRW 39.1bn / KRW 17.9bn in Q3, KRW 42.4bn / KRW 22.1bn in Q4 and KRW 40.0bn / KRW 11.4bn in Q1 2026, before Q2 2026 posted revenue of KRW 38.8bn with an operating loss of KRW 25.0bn and a net loss to owners of KRW 24.7bn, the largest operating loss of the five quarters.

Summed over the four quarters from Q3 2025 to Q2 2026, revenue was KRW 160.3bn with an operating loss of KRW 76.4bn and a net loss to owners of KRW 67.0bn.

The balance sheet has grown heavier: total liabilities of KRW 300.5bn against equity of KRW 247.7bn put the end-2025 debt-to-equity ratio at 121.3%, up in steps from 56.1% in 2022, 84.3% in 2023 and 89.7% in 2024. Operating cash flow turned from positive KRW 38.7bn in 2024 to negative KRW 2.3bn in 2025.

In a securities filing the company stated that operating losses in 2024 and 2025 worsened its financial position and that external funding produced interest expense exceeding roughly 10% of revenue.

05

Industry analysis

The company sits across three distinct end-market cycles. First, mobile cover glass faces structural headwinds from shrinking Greater China volumes, and recovery depends heavily on whether a specific customer's component procurement normalizes.

Second, automotive cover glass is driven by larger and more premium in-vehicle displays as autonomous driving and electric vehicles spread, with revenue recognized over multi-year project cycles and therefore relatively less volatile quarter to quarter.

Third, the new glass-materials businesses are tied directly to the artificial-intelligence investment cycle. Glass platters offer better thermal stability than aluminum and can be made thinner, allowing more platters in the same space, while higher flatness raises areal storage density.

On competition, one analysis noted that Japan's HOYA effectively monopolizes the global HDD glass-platter market and that supply-shortage concerns amid expanding data-center investment are increasing HDD makers' appetite for supply-chain diversification.

TGV glass substrates are a next-generation packaging technology replacing organic substrates with glass, gaining attention for low electrical loss and thermal stability as signal speed, heat control and power efficiency grow more critical.

The shared risk is that glass substrates remain pre-commercial industry-wide, with materials, substrate and equipment vendors in Korea and abroad all attempting entry at once, leaving standards and adoption timing unsettled.

06

Outlook

The company's published roadmap frames 2026 as the start of revenue visibility and 2027 as the mass-production point for glass substrates.

It says it built full-process vertical integration within roughly two years of entering the semiconductor glass-substrate business in 2024, and the CEO said projects and evaluations are underway with a global top-tier chipmaker and packaging firms in Japan, Europe and Greater China targeting 2027 mass production, with a strategic new production line under review in Korea rather than Vietnam.

The company explained that its 2.0mm product is built from a single glass panel rather than bonding two 1.0mm panels, and that it has secured a mass-production yield of about 94%.

With Japan's TOPPAN it announced a July 2026 commercialization agreement covering joint technology validation and mass-production application.

On HDD, the company said it is in volume-ramp evaluation with a global HDD maker, described that stage as immediately preceding mass production, and noted it had passed the customer's quality conformance assessment.

Among outside estimates, Small Insight Research in a May 2026 report projected 2026 revenue of KRW 401.1bn and a swing to operating profit of KRW 68.9bn, estimating the HDD business alone could contribute KRW 200-300bn.

That said, already-disclosed first-half 2026 results were KRW 40.0bn in Q1 and KRW 38.8bn in Q2, or KRW 78.8bn combined, so closing the gap to such full-year estimates depends entirely on how fast new-business revenue is recognized in the second half.

The same report stated that it withheld an investment opinion, citing the possibility of mass-production delays and financial strain from aggressive capital spending.

07

Valuation

PER
—
PBR
5.0×
ROE
-27.1%
EPS
-₩1,173
BPS
₩3,807
Dividend per share
₩0

Because losses attributable to owners have continued across the most recent four quarters, no earnings-based multiple can be calculated, which is why the price-earnings field on the summary card is blank.

As a result, the market price reflects the possibility of commercializing glass substrates and HDD platters rather than current profits, and the shares trade at a premium to the company's net assets. No cash dividend was paid for the latest fiscal year, so there is no dividend yield to compare against peers.

For reference, Eugene Investment & Securities in an April 2026 report presented a Buy rating and a target price of KRW 26,000, assessing that the shares were then trading below the domestic peer-group average multiple on 2026 estimates, while Small Insight Research in a May 2026 report stated it was withholding an investment opinion because of mass-production delay risk and capital-spending burden.

The gap between those two positions itself illustrates that the valuation here hinges on new-business progress disclosures rather than on reported metrics. A practical approach is therefore to check, in sequence, whether supply contracts are signed and whether the resulting revenue shows up in quarterly results.

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are all calculated in-house (the same method as Naver and Toss) · Dividend yield = cash dividend per share from DART filings (supplemented by KRX) ÷ current price · As of 2026-09-04

08

Bull factors

Tangible automotive cover-glass backlog

In June 2026 the company said it had secured automotive 3D cover-glass supply contracts worth a combined KRW 250bn from three customers, including European and U.S. luxury car brands.

It attributed the wins to anti-fingerprint coating validated beyond 50,000 cycles, anti-glare spray coating, curved printing and 3D thermoforming, and said the awards bring it to a mass-production setup covering seven vehicle models since it began automotive 3D cover-glass production in 2021.

Project lifecycles are longer than in mobile and models accumulate, giving a relatively steadier revenue base. That can support the downside of legacy revenue even if the new businesses slip.

External validation of glass-substrate progress

In June 2026 the company said it had secured a multi-thickness lineup from 0.3mm to 2.0mm, with validation completed at some Taiwanese and Korean substrate makers and validation ongoing at a Japanese manufacturer.

In July it signed an agreement with Japan's TOPPAN Holdings to commercialize glass substrates for next-generation semiconductor packaging, jointly validating the technology and preparing for mass production, with a 2027 target.

Unlike earlier stages, progress is now disclosed through an agreement with an external partner rather than self-announcement alone. Still, the agreement was disclosed without contract size or timeline details, which should be weighed alongside it.

Supply-chain diversification demand in HDD platters

The company said it is in volume-ramp evaluation for glass platters with a global HDD maker, described that stage as immediately preceding mass production, and noted it passed the customer's quality conformance assessment.

One analysis noted the market is effectively monopolized by Japan's HOYA, so growing supply-shortage concerns from expanding data-center investment increase HDD makers' need to diversify suppliers. Given high entry barriers, a supplier that has cleared qualification holds a defensible position.

Yet the size and pricing of a first mass-production contract remain undisclosed, so the profit contribution is not yet quantifiable.

09

Bear factors

Losses outsized relative to revenue

The 2025 operating loss of KRW 78.0bn exceeded 40% of that year's KRW 185.7bn revenue, and the operating margin deteriorated sharply to -42.0% from -16.9% in 2024. The operating loss narrowed to KRW 11.4bn in Q1 2026 before widening again to KRW 25.0bn in Q2, suggesting cost control is not yet stable.

Revenue has hovered around KRW 40bn per quarter since KRW 39.1bn in Q3 2025, a level that struggles to absorb fixed costs. Until new-business revenue is recognized in earnest, losses continue to consume equity.

Financial strain and dilution potential

The debt-to-equity ratio reached 121.3% at end-2025, more than double the 56.1% of 2022, with equity of KRW 247.7bn against liabilities of KRW 300.5bn.

The company explained that its 2025 current ratio fell to 136.87%, down 259.68 percentage points year on year, driven by the consolidation of Hanul & Jeju and two convertible bond issues.

It also said that in Q1 2026 it issued a fifth-series convertible bond of KRW 5bn to Sangsangin Savings Bank for R&D and working capital. In addition, its board resolved on April 9, 2026 to conduct a rights offering with unsubscribed shares placed via public offering. Repeated convertible issuance and equity raises leave a standing dilution factor as share count rises.

Gap between expectations and reported results

Outside estimates projected 2026 revenue of KRW 401.1bn and a swing to operating profit of KRW 68.9bn. Yet disclosed results showed Q1 2026 revenue of KRW 40.0bn and Q2 of KRW 38.8bn, or KRW 78.8bn for the first half, with operating losses in both quarters.

Meeting the annual estimate would require large new-business revenue to be recognized within the remaining period. If forecasts run ahead of actual contract disclosures, the risk of expectation resets follows.

10

Risk factors

Customer concentration and regional risk

Commentary attributed the earnings deterioration to reduced mobile volumes from a Greater China customer's chip-procurement problems, which shrank tempered-glass revenue and generated costs such as inventory valuation losses.

With high dependence on a specific customer, geopolitical and export-control variables feed straight into revenue. The company is diversifying into automotive and markets such as India, but replacement will take time to offset the decline.

Because manufacturing is concentrated in the Vietnamese unit, local labor costs, exchange rates and infrastructure also act directly on the cost base.

Commercialization timing risk in new businesses

The company said it is running projects and evaluations with a global integrated device manufacturer and packaging firms in Greater China, Japan, Europe and Korea, targeting 2027 mass production. Glass substrates remain pre-commercial industry-wide, so final adoption timing and standards are unsettled.

The possibility of mass-production delays and financial strain from aggressive capital spending were cited as reasons for withholding an investment opinion. If evaluation and agreement stages do not convert into binding supply contracts, the front-loaded investment remains as cost only.

Funding and governance-related risk

The company itself stated that continued operating losses could worsen financial stability and adversely affect going-concern prospects, and that share-price declines could trigger loan repayment demands, failed maturity extensions or additional borrowing.

It disclosed that after affiliate Hanul & Jeju was designated an investment-caution issue on March 29, 2026, the stake held through a partnership became subject to a six-month lock-up.

Management said it feels responsible for the weakened financial position and plans to use rights-offering proceeds for working capital while improving soundness through disposals of affiliates and financial assets.

If funding rounds repeat while the core business recovery lags, interest expense and dilution accumulate together.

11

What to watch next

  1. Mid-November 2026

    Q3 2026 quarterly report. The key points are whether revenue turns up from Q2 2026's KRW 38.8bn with its KRW 25.0bn operating loss, and whether new-business revenue starts to be recognized separately.

  2. Q4 2026

    Watch whether the HDD glass-platter volume-ramp evaluation converts into a binding supply contract and a mass-production disclosure. Since the company described it as immediately preceding mass production, disclosure of contract size and delivery start is the dividing line for earnings impact.

  3. Q4 2026 to H1 2027

    Disclosure of the investment size and funding method for the domestic TGV production-line expansion the CEO said was under review. An expansion decision can signal confirmed demand, but depending on the funding method it affects leverage and share count.

  4. February-March 2027

    Confirmed full-year 2026 results and the annual report. Check the direction of the 2025 baselines - a -42.0% operating margin, 121.3% debt-to-equity and negative KRW 2.3bn operating cash flow - along with how the segment revenue mix has been reshaped.

  5. During 2027

    Whether the company reaches its stated 2027 TGV mass-production target and whether the TOPPAN agreement advances into a firm contract. Since scope and timing were not disclosed at the agreement stage, the crux is whether specific volumes and pricing appear in filings.

12

Overall view

JNTC sits in the middle of shifting its business structure from a mobile cover-glass maker to a glass-materials company. In the numbers, that transition has been costly.

Revenue fell from KRW 323.4bn in 2023 to KRW 185.7bn in 2025, operating results reversed from a KRW 28.5bn profit to a KRW 78.0bn loss over the same period, and the debt-to-equity ratio rose from 84.3% to 121.3%.

Into 2026, Q1 revenue of KRW 40.0bn with an operating loss of KRW 11.4bn and Q2 revenue of KRW 38.8bn with a KRW 25.0bn loss show that a profit recovery is not yet evident.

On the business side, however, progress has been disclosed in sequence: KRW 250bn of automotive cover-glass awards, development of a 0.3-2.0mm TGV substrate lineup with a TOPPAN commercialization agreement, and entry into volume-ramp evaluation with a global HDD maker.

Which of these two streams reaches the income statement first is the frame for viewing this company, and the timing of new-business revenue recognition plus the chosen funding method will set that pace.

This material is provided for informational purposes only and does not contain an investment opinion or any buy or sell recommendation.

13

Sources

  1. Korea Exchange (KRX) — Prices · Market Cap · Volume
  2. FSS electronic disclosure system (DART) — Financial statements · Dividend filings
Show 18 more articles and sources
  1. edaily.co.kr
  2. newspim.com
  3. thelec.kr
  4. goinsider.kr
  5. kind.krx.co.kr
  6. v.daum.net
  7. mt.co.kr
  8. edaily.co.kr
  9. ic-pcb.com
  10. etoday.co.kr
  11. view.asiae.co.kr
  12. thelec.net
  13. kind.krx.co.kr
  14. comp.fnguide.com
  15. zdnet.co.kr
  16. dailyinvest.kr
  17. news.nate.com
  18. alphasquare.co.kr

Report written 2026-09-05 · Data as of 2026-09-04

This content is AI analysis of market data and web search results, provided for information only. It is not a solicitation or recommendation to invest. Investment decisions and their consequences are the investor's own responsibility. Data may be delayed or contain errors.