KOSPIEnergy & Power112610

CS Wind

₩55,300▲ 1.28%2026-10-02 close

Market Cap

₩2.3T

Turnover

₩22.9B

Volume

410,000 shares

Shares out.

42.2M

PER

479.1×

PBR

1.5×

EPS

₩98

Dividend Yield

2.13%

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are calculated in-house from the last 4 quarters (2025Q3–2026Q2) · Dividend yield is based on ₩1,000 per share · Prices as of the 2026-10-02 close

Report overview

Double-Digit Margins, Policy Variables Still Live

CS Wind posted a record 10.9% operating margin in 2025 but net profit was gutted by a large fourth-quarter impairment; quarterly operating profit has been recovering through the first half of 2026, while the sunset of US manufacturing tax credits and offshore project timing remain the biggest swing factors.

1
2025 revenue of KRW 2,931.6bn came in below 2024's KRW 3,072.5bn, yet operating profit rose to KRW 320.3bn, lifting the operating margin from 8.3% to 10.9% - margin expansion despite a smaller top line.
2
The fourth quarter of 2025 produced a KRW 154.2bn net loss attributable to owners. Kiwoom Securities, in a February 2026 report, cited roughly KRW 220.5bn of impairment charges and the closure of the low-margin Lindo facility.
3
Second-quarter 2026 operating profit of KRW 86.0bn (12.5% margin) is the highest within the period shown from 2Q25 to 2Q26, while revenue of KRW 686.4bn slipped from KRW 711.1bn in the prior quarter.
4
The Pueblo, Colorado plant qualifies for the Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit under the IRA at three cents per watt of wind tower output, though debate over an earlier sunset date continues.
5
US competitor capacity is shrinking: brokerage material circulated in August 2026 indicates Broadwind plans to end tower production in the third quarter of 2026 and Arcosa intends to cut its tower plants from four to two.

Business structure

Founded in 2006 and listed on the KOSPI market in November 2014, CS Wind manufactures wind turbine towers along with tower internals and bearings.

The bulk of revenue comes from tower manufacturing, and the company has been expanding offshore tower output in Europe while entering the substructure business including monopiles.

Substructures sit with CS Wind Offshore, the unit built around the acquired Danish producer Bladt Industries, so the dual portfolio of towers (mostly onshore) and substructures (offshore) is the main source of earnings volatility.

Production is spread across Pueblo in Colorado, Vietnam, Portugal and Denmark, with management describing the Vietnamese plant as the core hub for technology and skilled labor.

Key customers are global turbine makers such as Vestas and Siemens Gamesa plus developers including Orsted, which leaves customer concentration relatively high.

Because towers are bulky and heavy, proximity to demand is central to competitiveness, and US Commerce Department anti-dumping duties together with EU measures on Chinese towers effectively act as entry barriers.

In terms of competitive structure, two or three players tend to lead each region and Chinese suppliers have had limited access to the US and Europe. Layered on top, downsizing and exits by US rivals are pushing the industry toward a tighter oligopoly.

Segment revenue splits are not available from confirmed company filings, so this report treats them qualitatively only.

Earnings trend

Quarterly revenue · Operating profit

₩650B₩59.3B25Q2₩597B₩65.7B25Q3₩782.7B₩70.2B25Q4₩711.1B₩74.3B26Q1₩686.4B₩86B26Q2

RevenueOperating profit

Annual revenue · Operating profit

₩1.4T₩42.1B2022₩1.5T₩104.7B2023₩3.1T₩255.5B2024₩2.9T₩320.3B2025

RevenueOperating profit

Quarterly results · Last 5 quarters
Quarter	Revenue	Operating profit	Op. margin
2025Q2	₩650B	₩59.3B	9.1%
2025Q3	₩597B	₩65.7B	11.0%
2025Q4	₩782.7B	₩70.2B	9.0%
2026Q1	₩711.1B	₩74.3B	10.4%
2026Q2	₩686.4B	₩86B	12.5%

Annual results
Year	Revenue	Operating profit	Net income (parent)	Op. margin	ROE	Debt-to-equity
2022	₩1.4T	₩42.1B	-₩1B	3.1%	−0.1%	92.5%
2023	₩1.5T	₩104.7B	₩19.9B	6.9%	2.2%	199.9%
2024	₩3.1T	₩255.5B	₩142.3B	8.3%	12.4%	200.7%
2025	₩2.9T	₩320.3B	₩34.7B	10.9%	3.0%	167.7%

Consolidated basis (financial statements including subsidiaries) · Final figures from DART filings · Net income attributable to owners of the parent · Data as of 2026-09-04

Earnings analysis

Over multiple years, revenue jumped from KRW 1,374.9bn in 2022 and KRW 1,520.2bn in 2023 to KRW 3,072.5bn in 2024, then eased to KRW 2,931.6bn in 2025.

Operating profit, by contrast, rose four years running: KRW 42.1bn in 2022 (3.1% margin), KRW 104.7bn in 2023 (6.9%), KRW 255.5bn in 2024 (8.3%) and KRW 320.3bn in 2025 (10.9%). In other words 2025 was a year of lower revenue but higher profit, with mix, pricing and productivity offsetting weaker volumes.

Net profit attributable to owners, however, shrank from KRW 142.3bn in 2024 to KRW 34.7bn in 2025, reflecting the KRW 154.2bn owners' net loss booked in the fourth quarter of 2025.

Since that quarter still delivered KRW 70.2bn of operating profit, the loss was non-operating in nature; Kiwoom Securities in a February 2026 report cited roughly KRW 220.5bn of impairment and the closure of the Lindo plant.

Quarterly figures run as follows: 2Q25 revenue KRW 650.0bn with operating profit KRW 59.3bn (9.1%), 3Q25 KRW 597.0bn and KRW 65.7bn (11.0%), 4Q25 KRW 782.7bn and KRW 70.2bn (9.0%), 1Q26 KRW 711.1bn and KRW 74.3bn (10.4%), and 2Q26 KRW 686.4bn and KRW 86.0bn (12.5%) - revenue zig-zagged while operating profit rose for five straight quarters.

For the first half of 2026 combined, revenue was KRW 1,397.5bn, operating profit KRW 160.3bn and owners' net profit KRW 102.6bn.

On cash flow, operating cash flow expanded to KRW 527.7bn in 2025 from KRW 49.1bn in 2024, while liabilities fell from KRW 2,409.2bn to KRW 2,014.9bn, taking the debt-to-equity ratio down from 200.7% to 167.7%.

Equity, though, was essentially flat at KRW 1,200.3bn in 2024 versus KRW 1,201.7bn in 2025, showing that the impairment absorbed the year's earnings accumulation.

Industry analysis

The end market is split between US onshore wind and European offshore wind, and the two sit at different points in the cycle.

In the US, the OBBBA enacted in July 2025 grants subsidies to projects completed by end-2027 or that began construction by July 4, 2026, and press reports describe a bunching of orders ahead of that deadline.

Consistent with that, the US accounted for 53.2% of the USD 314mn of tower orders booked in the third quarter of 2025, while brokerage tallies put fourth-quarter tower orders at USD 620mn, roughly double the prior quarter, with about 60% tied to the US.

Because part of this represents pulled-forward demand, the risk of an air pocket after the deadline is an industry-wide talking point.

On supply, raw-material and policy volatility have driven smaller players out, and the exit of Broadwind, previously the third-largest US tower maker, is cited as emblematic of consolidation.

Brokerage material circulated in August 2026 projected US industry tower capacity falling from around 10GW to roughly 7GW a year.

European offshore wind is in a phase of reworking project economics through more realistic contract prices, inflation indexation and longer contract terms, while Korean policy discussion has centered on converting already-permitted projects into construction.

Global new installations have recovered to record levels, but with China and onshore dominating the mix, it is hard to conclude that non-China offshore supply chains have fully recovered.

Outlook

Around the first-quarter 2026 results, the company was reported to have secured most of its 2026 production volume.

Concerns about a project gap in the substructure business during the second half of 2025 eased as new orders were booked to underpin 2026 revenue, and the closure of the low-margin Lindo plant has been flagged as a variable for substructure profitability in 2026.

At the US entity, a company-wide productivity improvement program is under way, with brokerages noting roughly 20% productivity gains achieved in a short period, and normalization of utilization at expanded capacity is presented as the key earnings lever.

The AMPC remains a core profit item, with first-quarter 2026 receipts reported at around KRW 33.0bn.

On policy, the Trump administration's withdrawal in June 2026 of its appeal against a ruling voiding a wind-related executive order was read as easing near-term uncertainty, yet discussion over moving up the tax-credit sunset has not concluded.

Eugene Investment & Securities stated in a June 2026 report that, helped by expanding US onshore installations and rising European offshore tower demand, 2026 and 2027 revenue and operating profit would hold at around KRW 3trn and KRW 300bn respectively.

That is one brokerage's estimate rather than company-confirmed guidance and should be read accordingly. Longer term, floating offshore wind towers and European transition-piece substructure orders are cited as new axes, though both hinge on project final investment decision timelines.

Valuation

PER

479.1×

PBR

1.5×

ROE

0.3%

EPS

₩98

BPS

₩30,964

Dividend per share

₩1,000

Earnings-based multiples are heavily distorted right now.

Summed owners' net profit for the four most recent quarters, from 3Q25 through 2Q26, remains very small because of the large fourth-quarter 2025 loss, so a price-to-earnings figure derived from it cannot be taken as representative of normalized earning power and is not comparable with past trading bands.

Operating profit, by contrast, has risen for five consecutive quarters and the operating margin stayed in double digits through the first half of 2026, making the gap between operating-level profitability and reported net income the central issue for valuation.

On an asset basis the shares trade at a premium to net assets, with the notable feature on the denominator side being that equity was flat between end-2024 and end-2025.

Eugene Investment & Securities said in a June 2026 report that despite CS Wind's position as a leader operating manufacturing bases worldwide, it carries an excessive discount versus overseas wind peers, with both earnings- and asset-based multiples far below the overseas peer average.

A cash dividend per share was declared for fiscal 2025, producing a dividend yield, but in a business with this much earnings volatility the sustainability of the payout needs to be checked alongside normalization of substructure segment profitability.

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are all calculated in-house (the same method as Naver and Toss) · Dividend yield = cash dividend per share from DART filings (supplemented by KRX) ÷ current price · As of 2026-09-04

Bull factors

Step-by-step margin gains and cash generation recovery

The operating margin climbed for four straight years, from 3.1% in 2022 to 6.9% in 2023, 8.3% in 2024 and 10.9% in 2025. On a quarterly basis, 2Q26 operating profit of KRW 86.0bn and a 12.5% margin were the highest within the period shown.

Operating cash flow expanded to KRW 527.7bn in 2025 from KRW 49.1bn in 2024, while the debt-to-equity ratio fell from 200.7% to 167.7% over the same period. That profit and cash improved even in a year of lower revenue is the starting point of the bull case.

Tighter oligopoly as US supply shrinks

Broadwind, formerly the third-largest US tower maker, announced its exit from tower manufacturing, and brokerage material circulated in August 2026 indicates Arcosa plans to cut its tower plants from four to two. US industry tower capacity was accordingly projected to shrink from around 10GW to roughly 7GW per year.

Because towers carry heavy freight costs, local production is itself the competitive edge, and anti-dumping duties limit Chinese entry. The fact that the company operates its own US plant and can therefore respond without tariff exposure is also frequently cited.

Partial policy relief and secured volumes

The Trump administration's June 2026 withdrawal of its appeal against a ruling voiding a wind-related executive order was read as reducing near-term policy risk. Around the first-quarter 2026 results, the company was reported to have locked in most of its 2026 production volume.

AMPC receipts of about KRW 33.0bn were reported for the first quarter of 2026, so the credit still contributes to profit. Rising electricity demand from AI data centers is also cited as a potentially supportive factor for renewable order flow.

Bear factors

Tax-credit sunset and payback from pulled-forward demand

The OBBBA framework grants subsidies to projects completed by end-2027 or that started construction by July 4, 2026, and order bunching ahead of that deadline has been observed. The flip side is a possible ordering gap once the deadline passes.

With debate over an earlier AMPC sunset unresolved, any reduction in the credit could change the profit structure of the US business. Smaller US tax credits would also worsen project economics themselves, a channel through which weakness can pass through to equipment demand.

Asset risk exposed by the one-off impairment

Fourth-quarter 2025 operating profit was a positive KRW 70.2bn, yet the owners' net loss reached KRW 154.2bn. Kiwoom Securities in a February 2026 report cited roughly KRW 220.5bn of impairment and the closure of the Lindo plant.

As a result, 2025 owners' net profit of KRW 34.7bn was far below the KRW 142.3bn of 2024, and equity was essentially flat at KRW 1,200.3bn at end-2024 versus KRW 1,201.7bn at end-2025. With numerous overseas entities, the possibility of recurring deterioration at a particular subsidiary is a core bear argument.

Customer concentration and pricing pressure

Revenue leans heavily on a small number of turbine makers such as Vestas and Siemens Gamesa, so changes to customer ordering or installation schedules feed straight into results. Analysts note that cost-cutting drives by turbine OEMs can pressure tower makers' selling prices and margins.

The substructure business is exposed to delays in offshore project final investment decisions, leaving room for revenue gaps to recur. Indeed, concerns about a substructure workload gap were actively debated for the second half of 2025.

Risk factors

Policy and regulation

The US AMPC, applied at three cents per watt of wind tower output, is a meaningful profit contributor. Legislative pushes to bring forward its sunset have surfaced repeatedly and were reported as still under discussion in 2026.

There were easing signals such as the withdrawn appeal, but the scope for another shift in administration policy remains. Changes to eligibility conditions and to sharing ratios with customers could also alter the amount actually received.

Earnings volatility and accounting

Quarterly revenue has swung between KRW 686.4bn and KRW 782.7bn depending on delivery timing, and in the past deferred revenue at the US tower entity was reported to have distorted quarterly results.

As in the fourth quarter of 2025, a large impairment can produce a net loss even alongside operating profit, so net-income-based metrics must be read with care. Higher depreciation from capital spending at the European substructure entity has also been identified as a past drag on profit. In such a structure, a single quarter is a weak basis for calling a trend.

Balance sheet and FX

Liabilities stood at KRW 2,014.9bn at end-2025 with a debt-to-equity ratio of 167.7%, down from 200.7% a year earlier but still high in absolute terms. With production entities spread across the US, Europe and Asia, exchange rates, local inflation and steel and other raw-material prices feed directly into costs.

In the past, hyperinflation accounting at the Turkish entity was cited as a drag on profit. With capacity expansion and new business entries ongoing, capital spending and borrowing burdens need to be monitored together.

What to watch next

Late October to mid-November 2026
Third-quarter 2026 results. The checks are whether the five-quarter run of rising operating profit through 2Q26 and the double-digit operating margin hold, and how seasonality and delivery timing flow into revenue.
Fourth quarter of 2026
Progress of US legislative and administrative steps on the tax credit. Discussion over moving up the AMPC sunset and how the OBBBA condition of completion by end-2027 is applied are the variables that will shape US entity profitability and order flow beyond 2027.
Second half of 2026 through first half of 2027
Whether US competitor capacity cuts actually happen. If Broadwind's exit from tower production and Arcosa's plant reduction proceed as planned, US tower supply-demand, utilization and pricing negotiations could all shift.
As announced (single supply contract disclosures)
New order disclosures for European offshore substructures and towers. The size and timing of CS Wind Offshore's bookings are the basis for judging revenue visibility beyond 2027 and whether substructure margins normalize.
Around February 2027
Confirmation of full-year 2026 results and the dividend decision. The key items are whether an impairment like the fourth quarter of 2025 recurs and whether substructure entity profitability actually improves after the Lindo plant closure.

Overall view

CS Wind, a leading global wind tower maker, carries a profit-improvement track record that lifted its operating margin from 3.1% in 2022 to 10.9% in 2025.

That said, 2025 was a year in which revenue fell from KRW 3,072.5bn to KRW 2,931.6bn and owners' net profit shrank from KRW 142.3bn to KRW 34.7bn on a large fourth-quarter impairment.

In the first half of 2026 the company posted revenue of KRW 1,397.5bn and operating profit of KRW 160.3bn, continuing the operating-level improvement, alongside expanded operating cash flow and a lower debt-to-equity ratio (200.7% to 167.7%).

The bull arguments are a tightening oligopoly as US rivals cut capacity, the local production footprint and already-secured 2026 volumes; the bear arguments are the tax-credit sunset and a possible order gap after the OBBBA deadline, dependence on a few customers, and the risk of renewed impairment.

The industry itself resists a single reading because US onshore and European offshore sit at different cycle points, and policy timetables at home and abroad heavily dictate when orders land.

Ultimately, the gap between operating-level earning power and reported net income, and the continuity of demand once policy deadlines pass, are the two axes to monitor. This report is for information purposes only and contains no buy or sell recommendation or target price for any security.

Sources

Korea Exchange (KRX) — Prices · Market Cap · Volume
FSS electronic disclosure system (DART) — Financial statements · Dividend filings

Show 18 more articles and sources

Report written 2026-09-05 · Data as of 2026-09-04

This content is AI analysis of market data and web search results, provided for information only. It is not a solicitation or recommendation to invest. Investment decisions and their consequences are the investor's own responsibility. Data may be delayed or contain errors.