KOSPIEnergy & Power052690

KEPCO Engineering & Construction Company

₩127,000▲ 0.95%2026-10-02 close
Market Cap
₩4.9T
Turnover
₩29.9B
Volume
240K
Shares out.
38.2M
PER
113.9×
PBR
6.9×
EPS
₩945
Dividend Yield
1.25%

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are calculated in-house from the last 4 quarters (2025Q3–2026Q2) · Dividend yield is based on ₩1,347 per share · Prices as of the 2026-10-02 close

01

Report overview

Nuclear Design Monopoly, Stair-Step Recovery

Design revenue from Dukovany and Shin-Hanul 3&4 has begun to flow in, lifting profits off their trough, but quarterly margins still swing widely with project progress rates and labor costs.

  1. 1

    It is the only Korean firm able to perform both nuclear plant architect-engineering (A/E) and nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) design, serving as the design pillar of Team Korea.

  2. 2

    2025 revenue of KRW 518.8bn and operating profit of KRW 35.5bn fell short of 2024 (KRW 553.4bn and KRW 54.8bn), yet net profit rose to KRW 85.4bn on non-operating items including a gain from selling the old headquarters.

  3. 3

    First-half 2026 operating profit reached KRW 17.1bn, well above a year earlier, but the split was uneven: KRW 14.1bn in Q1 versus only KRW 3.0bn in Q2.

  4. 4

    The Dukovany 5&6 design contracts total KRW 1.62tn across A/E and NSSS scopes, to be recognized over a long horizon running to 2038.

  5. 5

    Offshore wind EPC (Wando Geumil, southwestern Jeonbuk) and the innovative SMR program form a non-nuclear growth axis, but conversion into main contracts still needs to be confirmed.

02

Business structure

KEPCO E&C has been the dedicated designer of Korea's nuclear power plants since joining the KEPCO group in 1982, operating as a specialist power-plant engineering firm.

It is the only Korean design house holding both nuclear plant A/E and NSSS design capabilities, with KEPCO and its generation subsidiaries as core clients, and it joins overseas nuclear bids as part of Team Korea alongside Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.

The business splits into three pillars: nuclear (A/E and O&M), reactor design and development (NSSS), and new energy (thermal, renewables, overseas EPC).

In a May 2026 report, LS Securities put 2025 segment revenue at KRW 347.0bn for nuclear, KRW 94.0bn for reactor design and KRW 77.8bn for new energy, leaving nuclear-related work as the overwhelming majority.

Beyond new-build design, the company covers maintenance of operating plants and decommissioning across the full plant lifecycle, leads a government SMR development project, and is developing its own marine small reactor known as BANDI.

Because clients are mostly state-owned entities, collection risk is low, but revenue recognition is tied to government policy and order timing.

Labor costs account for 40-50% of costs, a fixed-cost structure that delivers strong operating leverage when two or more large nuclear projects run in parallel, but erodes margins quickly when progress rates slip.

In renewables, building on the completed Jeju Hallim offshore wind project, it is working on Aphae (88MW) and Wando Geumil, where its EPC consortium with Hyundai E&C and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries was named preferred bidder, and it has signed a joint development agreement for nearshore wind in Vietnam.

Competitively, there is no direct domestic substitute designer, while overseas the company both competes and cooperates with a small group of designers such as Westinghouse.

03

Earnings trend

Quarterly revenue · Operating profit
RevenueOperating profit
Annual revenue · Operating profit
RevenueOperating profit
Quarterly results · Last 5 quarters
QuarterRevenueOperating profitOp. margin
2025Q2₩102.3B-₩4.4B−4.3%
2025Q3₩114.6B₩12.3B10.7%
2025Q4₩205.5B₩26.4B12.9%
2026Q1₩113.3B₩14.1B12.4%
2026Q2₩103.3B₩3B2.9%
Annual results
YearRevenueOperating profitNet income (parent)Op. marginROEDebt-to-equity
2022₩505.3B₩13.9B₩18B2.8%3.3%50.3%
2023₩545.1B₩28.6B₩32.7B5.2%6.0%56.2%
2024₩553.4B₩54.8B₩58.5B9.9%10.1%64.0%
2025₩518.8B₩35.5B₩85.4B6.8%13.7%41.7%

Consolidated basis (financial statements including subsidiaries) · Final figures from DART filings · Net income attributable to owners of the parent · Data as of 2026-09-04

04

Earnings analysis

Consolidated 2025 revenue came in at KRW 518.8bn, down from KRW 553.4bn in 2024, while operating profit fell from KRW 54.8bn to KRW 35.5bn, pushing the operating margin from 9.9% to 6.8%.

In a February 2026 report, LS Securities attributed the weakness to progress delays at Shin-Hanul 3&4 A/E work, Wolsong 3&4 O&M and the Romania CTRF project, lower NSSS workload at Saeul 3&4, and shrinking new-energy revenue as the Jeju Hallim offshore wind and Indonesia gas-engine plant projects wound down.

Net profit attributable to owners, by contrast, jumped to KRW 85.4bn from KRW 58.5bn in 2024, and LS Securities pointed to a roughly KRW 79bn gain on the disposal of the old headquarters in Q1 2025 as the driver of the pre-tax profit surge, indicating a large one-off, non-operating contribution.

That left 2025 with the unusual gap of falling operating profit alongside rising net profit, while operating cash flow slipped from KRW 49.0bn to KRW 29.3bn.

Over multiple years, revenue has hovered in a narrow band of KRW 505.3bn (2022), KRW 545.1bn (2023), KRW 553.4bn (2024) and KRW 518.8bn (2025), whereas operating profit swung far more widely at KRW 13.9bn, KRW 28.6bn, KRW 54.8bn and KRW 35.5bn.

Quarterly data make the volatility even clearer: Q2 2025 posted revenue of KRW 102.3bn with an operating loss of KRW 4.4bn, followed by KRW 12.3bn of operating profit in Q3 and a year-end concentration in Q4 with revenue of KRW 205.5bn and operating profit of KRW 26.4bn.

Kiwoom Securities, in a February 2026 report, explained the Q4 miss versus consensus through a change in how R&D project revenue is recognized, seasonal one-off costs such as bonuses, and extra design manpower deployed to lift progress rates.

In 2026, Q1 recovered to revenue of KRW 113.3bn and operating profit of KRW 14.1bn (12.4% margin), but Q2 delivered only KRW 103.3bn and KRW 3.0bn, so most of the KRW 17.1bn first-half operating profit was booked in the first quarter.

On the balance sheet, the debt-to-equity ratio fell from 64.0% in 2024 to 41.7% in 2025 and equity rose to KRW 625.0bn, leaving the financial capacity to run several large projects in parallel.

05

Industry analysis

The global nuclear cycle is widely described as entering its broadest expansion in decades, driven by AI data-center power demand converging with energy-security debates.

The United States designated nuclear as a core energy strategy in 2025 and set out plans to expand nuclear capacity from roughly 100GW today to 400GW by 2050, including ten new reactors. Domestic policy support has also continued.

Korea's finance ministry has been preparing a 2026 economic growth strategy that would newly designate silicon carbide power semiconductors and SMRs as national strategic technologies.

Barriers to entry in design work are extremely high, so KEPCO E&C enjoys a near-monopoly at home while remaining fully exposed to the ordering cycle.

In a February 2026 analysis, NH Investment & Securities estimated Westinghouse's large-reactor design workforce at 4,000-5,000 people, limited capacity for running many US and European projects at once, and noted that KEPCO E&C has handled up to eight units with roughly 2,000 design engineers.

In cycle terms, order intake has already turned up, but revenue is recognized gradually starting from pre-construction design work, so the lag between awards and reported earnings is unusually long in this industry.

Within the value chain, Doosan Enerbility supplies main equipment, KEPCO KPS handles maintenance and builders such as Daewoo E&C and Hyundai E&C handle construction, while KEPCO E&C sits upstream in design and therefore books revenue earlier in a project's life.

Offshore wind, however, still carries unresolved economics around REC pricing and financing, presenting a different kind of delay risk from nuclear.

06

Outlook

The clearest revenue anchor is the Czech project. Combining the A/E contract with KHNP and the NSSS design contract with Doosan Enerbility (KRW 373.4bn, signed 24 December 2025), total Dukovany 5&6 related contract value stands at KRW 1,624.3bn, with a contract term running to April 2038.

Kiwoom Securities, in a February 2026 report, estimated 2025 revenue from the Czech large-reactor project at roughly KRW 25bn and projected expansion to about KRW 100bn in 2026. Domestically, brokerages broadly agree that Shin-Hanul 3&4 has entered the phase of heavier revenue recognition.

On new orders, Samsung Securities said in a May 2026 report that the two large reactors and one SMR planned under the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply should be ordered no later than next year, and that based on Saeul 3&4 and Shin-Hanul 3&4 precedents, awards equivalent to 6-8% of total project cost can be expected.

On the non-nuclear side, Mirae Asset Securities estimated in May 2026 that converting the 600MW Wando Geumil offshore wind pre-commencement scope won in February 2026 into a main contract could yield roughly KRW 1tn of new orders, and the disclosure states that the pre-commencement contract may terminate early if an EPC contract is signed before 31 December 2026 or if the project is halted or cancelled, so the outcome should become visible before year-end.

A consortium including KEPCO E&C was also selected as preferred bidder for an 800MW offshore wind project in southwestern Jeonbuk and has been pursuing an implementation agreement with the provincial government. SMR sits on a longer timeline.

The innovative SMR development program runs from May 2024 to December 2027 with total technology fee revenue of KRW 400bn, of which the company's design portion is around KRW 100bn, and it targets standard design approval in 2028 and a construction permit in 2030.

07

Valuation

PER
113.9×
PBR
6.9×
ROE
6.0%
EPS
₩945
BPS
₩15,567
Dividend per share
₩1,347

The company's earnings base is still early in its recovery, and the sum of the last four quarters of profit falls short of the full-year 2025 net profit figure.

Because 2025 net profit contained sizeable non-operating one-offs such as the headquarters disposal gain, separating operating profit from net profit gives a truer read on underlying earnings.

Samsung Securities noted in a March 2026 report that KEPCO E&C's average price-to-earnings multiple since listing has been around 54 times, with an average of roughly 106 times during historical peak periods.

The current earnings-based multiple sits toward the upper part of that historical band, and the shares also trade at a premium to net asset value. Dividends are paid consistently, but the dividend yield itself runs below the KOSPI average, making the order pipeline rather than income the center of the equity narrative.

Separately, Kiwoom Securities assessed in May 2026 that market capitalization divided by order backlog stood at about 1.9 times, lower than the 3-5 times seen at major domestic nuclear and power peers.

That earnings-based and backlog-based multiples tell different stories is the crux of the valuation debate around this stock.

PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are all calculated in-house (the same method as Naver and Toss) · Dividend yield = cash dividend per share from DART filings (supplemented by KRX) ÷ current price · As of 2026-09-04

08

Bull factors

Long-dated Czech design backlog

Total contract value tied to Dukovany 5&6 stands at KRW 1,624.3bn, with terms running to April 2038. For a company with annual revenue in the KRW 500bn range, a single project of that size materially improves multi-year revenue visibility.

Kiwoom Securities projected in a February 2026 report that Czech large-reactor revenue would expand from roughly KRW 25bn in 2025 to around KRW 100bn in 2026. The Q1 2026 improvement was itself attributed to recognition of Czech and Shin-Hanul revenue.

Operating leverage from a fixed-cost base

Labor accounts for 40-50% of costs, a fixed-cost structure that leaves considerable room for margin improvement when two or more large nuclear projects run concurrently. In Q1 2026, despite revenue of only KRW 113.3bn, operating profit reached KRW 14.1bn for a 12.4% margin.

That compares with a 6.8% operating margin for full-year 2025. The same mechanism works in reverse, however, as shown by the KRW 4.4bn operating loss in Q2 2025.

Non-nuclear growth axis and policy support

Mirae Asset Securities estimated in May 2026 that the 600MW Wando Geumil pre-commencement scope won in February 2026 could translate into roughly KRW 1tn of new orders if converted into a main contract. A consortium including the company was also chosen as preferred bidder for an 800MW project in southwestern Jeonbuk.

On policy, plans to designate SMRs as a national strategic technology have been advancing within the 2026 economic growth strategy. These add revenue sources decoupled from the nuclear ordering cycle, broadening the business portfolio.

09

Bear factors

Wide swings in quarterly profit

Quarterly profit has swung sharply: an operating loss of KRW 4.4bn in Q2 2025, KRW 26.4bn of profit in Q4 2025, KRW 14.1bn in Q1 2026 and KRW 3.0bn in Q2 2026. Because margins hinge on progress rates and the timing of labor deployment, a single quarter says little about the trend.

Kiwoom Securities cited seasonal one-off costs such as bonuses and extra manpower added to lift progress rates as reasons for the weak fourth quarter in a February 2026 report. The concentration of first-half 2026 operating profit of KRW 17.1bn almost entirely in Q1 underlines how uneven earnings are.

High multiples versus current earnings

Samsung Securities noted in a March 2026 report that the share price at that time had pushed past 70 times 2026 estimated earnings, leaving some observers concerned about valuation. Relative to the current level of profit, the multiple sits toward the upper end of the post-listing average band.

LS Securities commented in a May 2026 report that the share price is difficult to explain through basic valuation grounded in near-term earnings. With expectations running ahead of reported results, any slippage in order timing widens that gap.

Shrinking new-energy revenue and order delays

New-energy revenue tallied by LS Securities in a May 2026 report shrank from KRW 125.3bn in 2024 to KRW 77.8bn in 2025. Kiwoom Securities also said in a May 2026 report that it had cut its new-energy revenue estimate by 33% versus its prior forecast.

The Wando Geumil pre-commencement contract itself discloses that it may terminate early if the project is halted or cancelled, so conversion into a main contract is not a settled fact. Offshore wind still faces unresolved economics around REC pricing and financing, leaving room for schedule slippage.

10

Risk factors

Policy and ordering-schedule risk

Most revenue comes from projects ordered by state-owned entities, leaving the company directly exposed to shifts in government energy policy and the national electricity supply plan.

Samsung Securities projected in a May 2026 report that the two large reactors and one SMR under the 11th Basic Plan would be ordered no later than next year, but the actual timing rests on policy decisions. Delayed orders leave design staff idle and raise the fixed-cost burden. Changes in administration or policy stance can transmit into earnings almost immediately.

Project cost and progress-rate risk

In Q4 2025 additional design manpower and other costs were reportedly deployed to lift progress rates, while a smaller Saeul 3&4 workload combined with weak Shin-Hanul 3&4 progress pushed the cost ratio higher.

In design services, revenue is recognized in line with progress, so when a client-side delay occurs, labor costs continue while revenue slips. This dynamic contributed to the operating margin falling from 9.9% to 6.8% in 2025. As overseas projects multiply, both execution complexity and cost volatility rise.

Overseas, geopolitical and sentiment risk

Overseas nuclear projects can see timelines shift substantially with host-country politics, permitting and financing. In the Czech Republic, whether Temelin 1&2 will be tendered and on what schedule both remain undetermined.

Potential participation in US AP1000 architect-engineering work was a scenario raised by KB Securities in a March 2026 report, a possibility under discussion rather than a signed contract. When expectations rather than firm contracts carry much of the equity narrative, volatility around news flow tends to increase.

11

What to watch next

  1. Around November 2026

    Q3 2026 results. The key checks are whether the drop in operating profit to KRW 3.0bn in Q2 was temporary, and how much Dukovany and Shin-Hanul 3&4 progress actually converted into revenue.

  2. Before 31 December 2026

    The Wando Geumil pre-commencement contract discloses that it may end early if an EPC contract is signed before 31 December or if the project is halted or cancelled. Whether a main EPC award is disclosed will be the pivot for a recovery in the new-energy segment.

  3. Around February 2027

    Confirmed full-year 2026 results. This will show how far the operating margin has recovered from 6.8% in 2025, and what net profit looks like without one-offs such as the headquarters disposal gain.

  4. During 2027

    Whether the two large reactors and one SMR under the 11th Basic Plan are actually tendered, a step Samsung Securities projected in a May 2026 report as coming no later than next year. This is the first gate for the domestic new-build pipeline to reach earnings.

  5. Through December 2027

    Progress on the innovative SMR development program (May 2024 to December 2027, with roughly KRW 100bn of technology fees for the company's design work) and whether the 2028 standard design approval target stays on track. These are the preconditions for SMR design service revenue.

12

Overall view

KEPCO E&C is the only Korean company capable of performing both nuclear plant architect-engineering and NSSS design, giving it a structurally favorable position as the nuclear cycle expands. Confirmed results, however, remain in the early stage of recovery.

Revenue of KRW 518.8bn and operating profit of KRW 35.5bn in 2025 both fell versus the prior year, while net profit of KRW 85.4bn leaned heavily on non-operating one-offs.

First-half 2026 operating profit of KRW 17.1bn was far above a year earlier, but the gap between KRW 14.1bn in Q1 and KRW 3.0bn in Q2 means earnings durability is still being tested.

The bull case rests on the KRW 1,624.3bn Dukovany design contracts, the domestic and overseas order pipeline, and room for operating-margin improvement from the fixed-cost base.

The bear case rests on wide quarterly swings, a shrunken new-energy segment, and the fact that expectations rather than signed contracts carry much of the discussion.

The next things to verify are whether margins recover in Q3, whether the Wando Geumil main contract materializes, and when the 11th Basic Plan orders are issued; this report is for information purposes and contains no buy or sell opinion.

13

Sources

  1. Korea Exchange (KRX) — Prices · Market Cap · Volume
  2. FSS electronic disclosure system (DART) — Financial statements · Dividend filings
Show 18 more articles and sources
  1. file.alphasquare.co.kr
  2. file.alphasquare.co.kr
  3. file.alphasquare.co.kr
  4. investing.com
  5. samsungpop.com
  6. investing.com
  7. markets.hankyung.com
  8. bbn.kiwoom.com
  9. bbn.kiwoom.com
  10. getdir.app
  11. stock1.brokdam.com
  12. v.daum.net
  13. m.thinkpool.com
  14. samsungpop.com
  15. investchosun.com
  16. pinpointnews.co.kr
  17. news.nate.com
  18. cbci.co.kr

Report written 2026-09-05 · Data as of 2026-09-04

This content is AI analysis of market data and web search results, provided for information only. It is not a solicitation or recommendation to invest. Investment decisions and their consequences are the investor's own responsibility. Data may be delayed or contain errors.