PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are calculated in-house from the last 4 quarters (2025Q3–2026Q2) · Dividend yield is based on ₩0 per share · Prices as of the 2026-10-02 close
Busan Casting remains under a trading halt tied to a delisting decision, with two consecutive years of capital impairment and extreme leverage meaning that restoring listing eligibility, not near-term earnings, is the central variable.
The KRX listing committee decided on delisting on November 17, 2025, but as of an April 2026 media report the stock remained under a trading halt, indicating the final clearance sale process had not yet been confirmed to start.
2025 consolidated revenue fell year over year to KRW 195.4 billion with an operating margin of only 0.3%, yet net income turned positive at KRW 1.72 billion.
Both the first and second quarters of 2026 reverted to operating and net losses, suggesting the 2025 swing to profitability was not sustained.
A KRW 7 billion third-party share placement completed in March 2026 was accompanied that same month by an audit report disclosing capital impairment above 50% for two consecutive fiscal years.
The debt-to-equity ratio peaked at 1,497.7% in 2023 and remained extremely elevated at 1,034.5% in 2025.
Founded in 1967, Busan Casting is a specialized manufacturer of cast metal components for automotive parts, headquartered and operating production facilities in Gijang-gun, Busan.
Its core products are casting materials used in engines, brake systems, and powertrain components, supplied to domestic and overseas automakers and Tier-1 parts suppliers.
The company operates as a single-segment business, with automotive parts manufacturing accounting for 100% of revenue as of the second quarter of 2026.
Facing declining demand for traditional cast parts amid the vehicle lightweighting trend, the company has reportedly sought to diversify into agricultural machinery parts and hydrogen and electric vehicle components.
Past reporting also indicates that large-scale plant expansion investment contributed to financial strain. As of 2026, the company is reported to have roughly 258 employees.
Within Korea's domestic casting industry it is considered a notable player, but as a small-cap listed company its financial scale and capital base lag larger parts makers. Its controlling shareholder changed in the second half of 2025 to a group led by an individual and four others.
| Quarter | Revenue | Operating profit | Op. margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025Q2 | ₩52.3B | ₩800M | 1.4% |
| 2025Q3 | ₩46.5B | ₩100M | 0.3% |
| 2025Q4 | ₩41.7B | -₩600M | −1.3% |
| 2026Q1 | ₩50.9B | -₩77,873,110 | −0.2% |
| 2026Q2 | ₩53.3B | -₩1.3B | −2.4% |
| Year | Revenue | Operating profit | Net income (parent) | Op. margin | ROE | Debt-to-equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | ₩230.5B | -₩6.5B | -₩8.1B | −2.8% | −35.2% | 910.0% |
| 2023 | ₩241.7B | ₩400M | -₩10.5B | 0.2% | −71.7% | 1497.7% |
| 2024 | ₩213B | ₩7.3B | -₩600M | 3.4% | −3.6% | 1316.7% |
| 2025 | ₩195.4B | ₩600M | ₩1.7B | 0.3% | 8.9% | 1034.5% |
Consolidated basis (financial statements including subsidiaries) · Final figures from DART filings · Net income attributable to owners of the parent · Data as of 2026-08-23
Over the past four fiscal years, revenue rose from KRW 230.5 billion in 2022 to KRW 241.7 billion in 2023, then declined for two straight years to KRW 213.0 billion in 2024 and KRW 195.4 billion in 2025.
Operating margin improved from a loss of -2.8% in 2022 to 0.2% in 2023 and 3.4% in 2024, before slipping back to 0.3% in 2025.
On the bottom line, the company posted net losses for three consecutive years from 2022 through 2024 (KRW -8.1 billion, -10.5 billion, and -0.57 billion respectively) before swinging to a net profit of KRW 1.72 billion in 2025; quarterly data show fourth-quarter 2025 net income alone reached KRW 6.33 billion, driving the full-year turnaround and suggesting a meaningful contribution from non-operating items, since full-year operating profit was only KRW 0.58 billion versus the larger net profit figure.
Tracing the quarterly path further, operating profit fell from KRW 0.76 billion in the second quarter of 2025 to KRW 0.13 billion in the third quarter, then turned to an operating loss of KRW 0.55 billion in the fourth quarter; losses widened further into 2026, with operating losses of KRW 0.08 billion in the first quarter and KRW 1.27 billion in the second quarter.
Net income also posted losses of KRW -2.41 billion and KRW -2.19 billion in the first and second quarters of 2026, respectively, meaning the trailing four-quarter net income (third quarter 2025 through second quarter 2026) totaled roughly KRW -0.52 billion, back in loss territory.
Operating cash flow, after an inflow of KRW 19.9 billion in 2022, turned negative for three straight years — KRW -3.45 billion in 2023, KRW -3.31 billion in 2024, and KRW -6.59 billion in 2025 — indicating persistently weak underlying cash generation despite the temporary accounting profit.
The debt-to-equity ratio surged from 910.0% in 2022 to 1,497.7% in 2023, then eased to 1,316.7% in 2024 and 1,034.5% in 2025, but remains in an extremely high-leverage range.
Korea's automotive parts casting industry faces the structural shift toward vehicle lightweighting. As aluminum and composite components spread, demand for traditional ferrous casting parts is reported to face long-term stagnation or contraction pressure.
The shift to electric vehicles is also altering the demand structure that had centered on internal combustion powertrain casting parts, requiring portfolio adjustments from legacy casting suppliers.
Against this backdrop, Busan Casting appears to have sought diversification into agricultural machinery and hydrogen or electric vehicle-related components, though the specific revenue contribution from these new areas has not been confirmed.
Within the industry, the company is classified as a long-established casting specialist, but as a small-cap listed company its investment capacity and financial buffer are relatively weaker than larger parts affiliates or better-capitalized competitors.
Compounding this, two consecutive years of capital impairment and an ongoing trading halt tied to listing eligibility mean that company-specific financial and listing risk currently weighs more heavily on the investment picture than the broader industry cycle.
No brokerage consensus for Busan Casting could be confirmed, and no separate company earnings guidance was identified in available disclosures.
Based on confirmed facts, the company raised KRW 7 billion in March 2026 through a third-party placement of 14 million new shares, with the new shares disclosed as scheduled to list on March 9, 2026.
An audit report from the same period disclosed standalone total assets of KRW 219 billion, total liabilities of KRW 199.7 billion, and total equity of KRW 19.3 billion, alongside capital impairment above 50% for two consecutive fiscal years.
A previously discussed lever for balance-sheet improvement is the sale of an industrial-park site in Ballyong-ri, Jangan-eup, Gijang-gun, Busan, though media reports indicate the related final payment schedule had been postponed multiple times, so its completion status and timing require further confirmation.
On the listing front, despite a delisting decision on November 17, 2025, an April 2026 report still classified the stock as under a trading halt, meaning the progress of follow-on procedures such as the start of a final clearance sale or any stay-of-effect injunction remains unconfirmed.
Under this structure, exchange disclosures related to listing eligibility may matter to investors as much as, or more than, operational earnings improvement itself.
Because Busan Casting appears to remain under a trading halt following its delisting decision, any displayed price and the valuation metrics derived from it should be understood as potentially reflecting the last traded price before the halt rather than values formed through live trading.
In terms of the relationship between share price and net assets, it is worth noting that two consecutive years of capital impairment have sharply reduced total equity itself, meaning the capital base underlying any net-asset-value calculation has fluctuated significantly year to year.
On the earnings side, the pattern of three consecutive years of net losses from 2022 through 2024, a swing to net profit in 2025, and a reversion to losses in the first half of 2026 makes it difficult to characterize earnings stability as established.
Regarding shareholder returns, the most recent disclosures indicate no per-share cash dividend, so there is no track record of dividend-based capital return.
Given these financial and listing-status specifics, resolving the capital impairment and confirming whether trading resumes are arguably the variables that need to be checked first, ahead of any conventional cross-company valuation comparison.
PER, EPS, PBR and BPS are all calculated in-house (the same method as Naver and Toss) · Dividend yield = cash dividend per share from DART filings (supplemented by KRX) ÷ current price · As of 2026-08-23
After three consecutive years of net losses from 2022 through 2024, consolidated net income turned positive in 2025 at KRW 1.72 billion. Fourth-quarter net income of KRW 6.33 billion drove the annual turnaround, so a recurrence of similar non-operating gain factors could support further improvement.
Whether this profit stemmed from core operations should be weighed against the 0.3% operating margin recorded for the year.
In March 2026 the company raised KRW 7 billion through a third-party share placement to secure operating funds. In addition, completion of the previously discussed sale of the industrial-park site in Gijang-gun, Busan, could bring a large cash inflow and reduce debt.
However, the final payment schedule for this sale has reportedly been postponed multiple times in the past, leaving execution timing uncertain.
Amid declining demand for traditional casting parts due to vehicle lightweighting, the company is reported to have sought to broaden its customer base into agricultural machinery and hydrogen or electric vehicle-related components.
This can be read as an attempt to restructure the business away from reliance on internal-combustion casting. However, the specific revenue contribution of these new business areas is not confirmed in public disclosures.
Unlike the full-year 2025 net profit, both the first quarter (KRW -2.41 billion) and second quarter (KRW -2.19 billion) of 2026 posted net losses.
The operating loss also widened to KRW 1.27 billion in the second quarter, pushing the trailing four-quarter net income (third quarter 2025 through second quarter 2026) back into negative territory. This suggests the 2025 turnaround may have been closer to a temporary factor than a structural improvement.
The debt-to-equity ratio spiked to 1,497.7% in 2023 and remained very high at 1,034.5% in 2025. A March 2026 audit report disclosed capital impairment above 50% for two consecutive fiscal years, showing that the company's capital buffer has been severely eroded. Such a structure could translate into liquidity strain if further fundraising or asset sales are delayed.
A delisting decision was handed down on November 17, 2025, and as of an April 2026 report the stock remained under a trading halt.
Depending on how follow-on procedures such as the start of a final clearance sale or a stay-of-effect injunction unfold, shareholders' ability to trade and potential recovery amounts could vary significantly. Regardless of any earnings improvement, the listing status itself remains the largest source of uncertainty.
Even after the November 2025 delisting decision, the trading halt has continued, indicating the final procedure for a clearance sale or continued listing has not concluded.
Depending on the outcome of any objection or injunction process, the timing and price at which shareholders can actually sell shares could vary significantly. Investors should prioritize monitoring the progress of this procedure over the company's operating results.
A financial structure marked by capital impairment above 50% for two consecutive fiscal years and a debt-to-equity ratio exceeding 1,000% could strain the going-concern assumption if further capital raising or debt restructuring is delayed.
Operating cash flow also posted net outflows for three consecutive years from 2023 through 2025, indicating weak internal cash generation. Under this structure, delays in planned asset sales or capital increases could heighten liquidity risk.
The shift toward vehicle lightweighting and the spread of electric vehicle powertrains are structural factors that could shrink demand for traditional casting parts over the long term.
The company's planned industrial-site sale has reportedly seen its final payment schedule postponed multiple times in the past, so execution risk remains in the balance-sheet improvement plan.
New business diversification also has yet to show a publicly confirmed revenue contribution, meaning it may take time for results to become visible.
Check whether third-quarter 2026 operating and net results extend the loss trend seen in the first half or show renewed improvement.
Monitor how the follow-on procedures for the ongoing trading halt after the November 2025 delisting decision are resolved, including any final clearance sale, objection, or injunction outcome.
Verify whether the repeatedly postponed final payment for the industrial-site sale in Ballyong-ri, Gijang-gun, Busan, is actually completed, and if so, the resulting scale of debt-ratio improvement.
Check whether the 2026 fiscal-year audit report shows an easing of the capital impairment ratio, or whether it triggers additional listing-risk criteria such as a third consecutive year of impairment above 50%.
Busan Casting is a long-established manufacturer of automotive casting components, but the most important variable for the current investment picture is not earnings performance itself but whether listing eligibility can be restored.
Full-year 2025 net income turned positive, but the operating margin was only 0.3%, and operating and net losses reappeared in the first half of 2026, meaning the durability of the 2025 turnaround has not been confirmed.
A debt-to-equity ratio above 1,000% and capital impairment above 50% for two consecutive fiscal years suggest the company needs to be evaluated by a different standard than a typical listed firm.
Given that the trading halt appears to have continued even after the November 2025 delisting decision, tracking the progress of any final clearance sale, objection, or injunction procedure should take priority over earnings analysis.
Attempts at balance-sheet improvement through an industrial-site sale or capital increase are confirmed, but uncertainty remains over their execution timing and completion. Investors should remain fully aware of this unusual listing and financial status and continue monitoring related disclosures.
Report written 2026-09-05 · Data as of 2026-09-04
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